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The bilateral trade imbalance between the United
States andJapan has already improved in real terms since
the exchange rate changes. However, the degree of
improvementhas been moderate todate. Thispaperexam-
inesfactorsinfluencingthe adjustmentprocessofthe trade
imbalance, focusing on relative price changes and struc-
turalfactors.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Since the meeting of the G-5 nations (France, Japan,
United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany) in
September 1985, a significant realignment of exchange
rates has taken place. Between September 1985 and
November 1987, the dollar fell against the Japanese yen
from236.63 yen/dollar to 135.37 yenldollar-adeprecia-
tion of 42.8 percent. Against a basket of major currencies,
the dollar depreciated over this period an average of 34.3
percent. I In response, policymakers shifted their n""",',,-,,
concern from encouraging further depreciation
dollar to stabilizing its value near current levels.
Such a drastic change in exchange values was expected
to help correct international trade imbalances. In general,
a currency realignment influences real trade flows by
changing relative prices between domestic and foreign
tradables, thereby altering the quantities of domestic and
foreign goods demanded. If the adjustment in exchange
rates were sizable and sustained long enough to convince
people that the trend would not be reversed in the foresee-
able future, it might also provoke supply responses.
Japan's trade surplus in real terms, in fact, has con-
tracted markedly since the beginning of 1986, as import
quantities haverisen and export quantities fallen (Table 1).
In addition, Japan's nominal trade surplus has started to
decline as well. With such changes in external trade
performance, the growth pattern of the Japanese economy
has experienced a rapid transformation from growth led by
external demand to growth led by domestic demand.
Since trade between Japan and the United States forms
the largest part of the two countries' respective external
imbalances, Japanese policyrnakers and their U.S. coun-
terparts have paid keen attention to developments in
Japan's bilateral surplus with the U.S. A under-
standing of the recent evolution of that trade therefore is
important. This paper seeks to contribute to that under-
standing by: 1)analyzing what actually has occurred to the
realbilateral merchandise trade since the currency realign-
ment, and 2) examining the factors affecting the adjust-
ment process of the bilateral trade imbalance.
With these two themes in mind, the remainder of this
paper is organized in the following manner. The first
section reviews the recent evolution of trade between Japan
and the United States. Sections Il and III discuss several
influences on the adjustment process in the bilateral trade
imbalance, focusing on the role of relative price changes
and structural factors, The last section offers a summary











I. Exchange Rate Realignment and the Japan-U.S. Trade
In fiscal 1986(fromApril 1986toMarch 1987),Japan's upwardturnwithlargefluctuationsarising fromimportsof
nominal trade surplus with the U.S. swelled by $8.7 nonmonetary gold.> Correspondingly, its real trade bal-
billionand recorded an all-time highof$52.0billion. This ance with respect to the U.S.4 has declined.
enormous bilateral trade surplus now accounts for more Two observations are in order, however. First, despite
thanhalf(57.9 percent infiscal 1986)ofJapan's total trade the sharp appreciationofthe yenagainst the dollar,Japan's
surplus. Viewedfromthe U.S. perspective,this surplus is real exports to the U.S. have not diminished significantly.
a trade deficit amounting to 34.5 percent of its total trade In fact, Japan's real exports to the U.S. dropped only by
deficit, and one that is far larger than its trade deficit with 2.7 percent between the third quarter of 1985 and the first
anyother single tradingpartner.AlthoughJapan's nominal quarter of 1987. Second, Japan's real imports from the
surpluswith the U.S. shows signsofflatteningout or even U.S. have not grown as quickly as those from other
declining modestly inrecentquarters (from$4.6 billion in regions. Japan's real imports from the U.S. recorded
the fourth quarter of 1986 to $4.3 billion in the third growth of 9.7 percent during the period, compared to
quarter of 1987, based on seasonally adjusted monthly growth rates of 48.9 percent and 22.3 percent, respec-
averages),the extentof improvementhasremained moder- tively, from the European Community and Asian coun-
ate due to the so-called J-curve effect. The J-curve tries.>These qualifications require further analysis.
describes the typical pattern of adjustment to changes in Chart 2 shows that Japan's real exports to the U.S. have
the relative value of a currency. Specifically,as a currency been depressed by the rise in relative prices since 1986,
appreciates, export prices rise and lead at first to an and that part of this effect has been offset by slow but
increase in the nominal value of exports even though the continued growth in the U.S. economy and the high
real value (that is, the quantity) falls as higher prices lead income elasticity of Japan's exports. These results come
to reduced demand. With time, eventhe nominal value of from a regression equation including relative price and
exports falls as demand fully adjusts to the higher prices. U.S. income variables.
Tomeasure accurately the effectivenessof the currency Since a variety of Japan's export items have been under
realignment incorrecting trade imbalances, it isnecessary administrative or voluntary export/import restraints,6 any
to examine the real bilateral trade balance.
An examination of Japan's real trade balance with
respect to the U.S., presented in Chart 1,2 shows that
Japan's real exports to the U.S. began to fall around
mid-1986, while its real imports from the U.S. took an
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Chart 2
Contributing Factors to the Growth of


















I. Contributing factors were estimated from the following real export equation:
In (real exports to the U.S.) = 3.46 * In (U.S. real domestic demand')
(17.5)




sample period: 1976/2Q 1987/IQ
R2 = 0.9229
analysis based on this traditional specificationofan export
equation may not capture price and income effects per-
fectly. Nevertheless, the reasonably good fit of the real
export equation estimated indicates that the yen's steep
climb has been a dominant factor in limiting the growth of
Japan's exports during the period under study? The posi-
tive residuals, however, suggest that otherfactors must be
examined to help explain why Japan's exports have not
responded even more. Likewise, it is important to analyze
the factors that have contributed to somewhat weak growth
in Japan's imports of U.S. goods.
2. Serial correlation corrected by a Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment (RHO = 0.74).
3. Independent variables are two-quarter moving averages of U.S. real domestic
demand and four-quarter moving averages of relative price.
* real GNP - real net exports
**weighted average of U.S. PPI and Japan's competitors' export prices / Japan's
export prices
In the following two sections, we will look at some of
the factors that have been affecting the current adjustment
ofthe Japan-U.S. bilateral trade imbalance in more detail.
The analysis will focus on 1) whether the deterioration in
Japan's relative export prices has, in fact, been restrained
relative to the depreciation ofthe dollar; 2) why and how
Japan's exports to the U.S. have been so responsive to the
growth in U.S. demand; 3) whether the composition of
U.S. trade with Japan has influenced U.S. exports to
Japan; and 4) whether the improvement in U.S. relative
export prices fully reflects the dollar's depreciation.
II. Factors Affecting Japan's Real Exports
Pricing Behavior Under the Strong Yen
Although Japan's real exports to the U.S. have been
substantially depressed by a rise in relative export prices,
many analysts contend that Japanese exporters have lim-
ited increases in their export prices and, instead, have
squeezed their profits in yen terms to prevent a marked
decline in their market shares. In other words, adjustment
in the bilateral trade imbalance has been delayed by the
practice of restraining export price hikes.
To analyze this argument, it is useful to introduce the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
concept of "cumulative pass-through." The cumulative
pass-through is defined as the ratio of the cumulative
percent change in export prices to the cumulative percent
change in exchange rates during a given period. The pass-
through in the current "yen-daka" (strong yen) phase is
much lower, hovering within a range of 50-55 percent.f
compared to a ratio of70-80 percent during the last strong
yen period in 1977-1978 (Chart 3). This lower pass-
through indicates that Japan's export prices have been less
responsive to exchange rate movements in the more recent
period.
5Commodity Composition of Japan's Exports
In addition to the restrained adjustment inexport prices,
another factor that has played a role in the moderate trade
adjustment to date is the commodity composition of
The reduced adjustment of Japan's export prices to
foreign export prices can be attributed mainly to stiff
competition from newly industrializing countries (NICs),
especially those in southeast Asia. For instance, Korea,
Hong Kong, and Singapore's combined share of U.S.
imports rose from only 3.7 percent in 1975 to 4.5 percent
in 1980; their share rose another 2.7 percentage points in
the following six years. Some of this increase in market
share may be ascribed to the fact that since 1985 the
exchange rates of their currencies have not appreciated
against the U.S. dollar as much as they have against the
yen.
In short, confronted with greater competition within a
stable price environment worldwide, Japanese firms were
unable to raise their export prices fully in response to the
rise in value of the yen. As a result, they accepted lower
unit sales (in terms of yen) from exports to avoid drastic
cutbacks in their production. to Thus, it is clear that
reduced pass-through has dampened the effect of the
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Since Japanese exporters' pricing strategies cannot be
independentof their competitors' prices in world markets,
it isuseful toexamine howJapan's export prices responded
to in To do so, we decom-
cumulative pass-through ratio into two
factors - "the world price inflation factor" and "the
Japanese exporters' adjustment factor" (Table 2). The first
factor measures the pass-through implicitly assuming that
Japan is a price-taker in the world export market. 9 The
second factor takes account of the extent to which Jap-
py,')",·tPl·'O may have been able to their export
in response to various elements such as foreign
competition, foreign demand and differences in
quality of products.
When we compare the value of each of these two
in the period 1985Q3-1987Q1 with their
values in the period 1977Q1-1978Q4, it is clear that both
lowerworld-wide inflation and increased foreign competi-
tion at atime of slower foreign demand growth contributed
to the lower pass-through in the more recent period.
The more modest increases in foreign export prices in
the laterperiod reflect the greater price stability worldwide
since the early 1980s. Many have argued that such price
has the opportunities to pass currency
appreciation through to export prices. At the same time,
especially of raw materials, lowered the
domestic costs of Japanese exporters and enabled
them to restrain the pass-through.
1
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(I Economic Review / Spring 1988Japan's exports to the U.S. This section examines the role
ofstructural factors in Japan's exports.
The analysis presented here divides Japan's real exports
to the U.S. into several major commodity categories!! -
consumer goods, production goods, capital goods includ-
ing office machinery, and capital goods excluding office
machinery. Chart 4 shows that real exports of consumer
goods to the U.S. have been falling since the beginning of
1986. This decline is primarily the result of the rise of
Japan's relative consumer goods export prices rather than
an overall decline in U.S. demand for consumergoods. In
fact, private consumption remained strong in the U.S.
while Japan's real exports of consumer goods dropped
20.2 percent between the first quarter of 1986 and the first
quarter of 1987.
Real exports of production goods, which ballooned in
1983 and 1984 in response to the pick-up in U.S. indus-
trial output, began to decline in the first half of 1985 and
have continued to decline through the first part of 1987.
The decline was, to a certain extent, due to the stagnant
business climate surrounding the worldwide electronics
industry. It also may have been due to the voluntary export
restraint on steel and iron introduced in October 1984,
since the exportquantity of production goods exclusive of
these commodities has followed a slightly upward trend.
Finally, real exports of capital goods including office
machinery have increasedquite rapidly in spite of the yen's
steep rise (the current level is about seven times higher
than in 1980), while the export volume of capital goods
excluding office machinery has remained virtually
unchanged since 1985 (the present level is about twice as
high as in 1980). These observations suggest that exports
of office machinery have played a major role in sustaining
Japan's overall exports despite the yen's rapid
appreciation.I?
The strong growth of office machinery exports is related
to changes in the structure of U.S. import demand. U.S.
private nonresidential fixed investment recovered quite
vigorously after 1983, fueled by tax reduction measures.
In the process, U.S. investment demand shifted toward
information processing and related peripheral
equipment, partly because advances in electronic technol-
ogy made such equipment considerably less expensive.
Office machinery and related equipment doubled its share
in total nonresidential equipment investment from 16.1
percent in the 1970s to 35.4 percent in 1985. The higher
relative price of U.S.-produced office equiprnent->
allowed imports of these items to flood in (more than a 30
percent increase at an annual rate). Its share in U.S. total
imports more than tripled in the last six years from 1.2
percent in 1980 to 3.9 percent in 1986.
A rapid response by Japan's exporters to changes in
foreign demand, supportedby technological advances and
competitive prices, and Japan's subsequent penetration of
the U.S. market'< have kept the income elasticity of
Japan's exports at a fairly high level. This high income
elasticity, together with sustained U.S. growth, have par-























Japan's Real Exports to the U.S.












Source: Ministry of Finance (Japan), Department of Commerce
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The Commodity Composition of Japan's Imports
As mentioned earlier, the growth in Japan's imports of
U.S. goods has been relatively moderate to date compared
with its imports from other trading partners. As a result,
the U.S. share of Japan's total imports, excluding those
from the Middle East, hasfallen from 38.4percent in 1960
to 26.9 percent in 1986, in sharp contrast to the sizable
gains by Asian NICs (+7.6percent points in the 26 years)
and the European Community (+7.1 percent).
Japan's aggregate real imports recorded seasonally
adjusted growth of 12.8 percent between the third Quarter
of 1985 and the first quarter of 1987. This increase was
dominated by accelerated imports of manufactured goods
(an increase of 23.0 percent). During the same period,
Japan's real imports ofraw materials showed practically no
gain (a meager increase of 1.8 percent) and imports of
foodstuffs did not increase asfast as those of manufactured
goods (an increase of 14.0 percent).
These developments reflect structural changes that have
been occurring in the Japanese economy. As illustrated in
Chart 5, imports of various kinds of industrial parts and
equipment (including those for general machinery, tele-
communication equipment, electric household
appliances, automobiles, and computers) have been
increasing steadily, while the growth of domestic produc-
tion of these final goods has been lackluster. Between
September 1985 and February 1987, the aggregate import
volume of these items increased by more than 20 percent
annually, while domestic industries' output increased only
slightly (+ 0.9 percent at an annual rate). Concurrently, in
materials-processing industries such as metals,
petroleum, chemicals, and textiles, a similar shift from
domestic production using imports of raw materials to
imports of semi-finished products is evident as a long-run
trend. Imports of semi-finished products increased by
about 50 percent between the end of 1979 and March
1987, while domestic production of those semi-finished
goods remained virtually unchanged, and imports of raw
materials gradually declined.
Thus, a steady increase in imports of intermediate
products generally has been evident in Japanese manufac-
turing industries. Moreover, imports of final products,
especially of consumer goods, also have grown rapidly as
a result of an increase in overseas production by Japanese
firms. 15 In this regard, it is significant to note that such
changes can be interpreted as a substitution of imports for
domestic production. This shift was encouraged not only
by changes in relative prices but also by technological
advances and increased supply capacity abroad.
With this structural shift in mind, a comparison of the
commodity compositionof U.S. exports to Japan with that
of the European Community is useful. The combined
1987 1986
~
Volume of Final Goods
Domestic Production
1985















Japan's Imports of Industrial Parts and
Domestic Production of Final Goods
Source: Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (Japan)
1. Japan's import volume of industrial parts is a weighted sum of import quantities of 76
commodities (such as, parts of electric machinery and transportation machinery).
2. Domestic production of final goods is a weighted sum of production indices of electric
machinery, transportation machinery, and general machinery.
8 Economic Review / Spring 1988share of foodstuffs and raw materials in U.S. exports to
Japan (39.2 percent) is more than twice as large as that in
EC exports (14.8 percent), whereas the share of manufac-
turedgoods in U.S. exports (60. 7 percent) is muchsmaller
than that in EC exports (85.5 percent). Thus, EC exports
have more of what Japan wants. This partly accounts for
the much faster growth in imports from the EC than from
the U.S. In sum, given the structural changes in the
Japanese economy, the countries whose exports comprise
more manufactured products have obvious advantages.
The structural composition of U.S. exports helps to
explain why overall U.S. exports to Japan have grown
more slowly. However, this alone cannot explain why the
growth in U.S. exports of individual commodity catego-
ries also has lagged behind the same commodities
exportedby othernations. The dataon commodityimports
in Table 3 implies that the primary cause of the slower
growth in U.S. exports does not lie in importbarriers since
the barriers apply to all exporting countries in the same
way. In the next section, we examine another factor that
may account for the divergent behavior- the adjustment
of U.S. relative export prices.
Adjustment ofU.S. Relative Export Prices
An historical comparison of United States producers'
pass-through ratios during the past three periods of dollar
depreciation(Table 4) showsthatthe ratio of exchangerate
depreciationto a fall in foreign currency exportprices (106
percent) in the present weak dollar phase is far higherthan
those in previous periods. In other words, the prices of
U.S. exports in foreign currency terms have dropped by
more than the depreciation in the exchange value of the
dollar.
As a result of this change in U. S. exporters' pricing
behavior, U.S. export unit value in dollar terms in 1986
remained practically unchanged from the previous year
(+0.3 percent), and its unit value expressed in yen terms
declined by 29.2percent. Although this improvement was
partially offset by more stable prices in Japan, U.S.
relative export prices declined by 25.6 percent against
Japan's domestic prices and returned to the pre-1980 level
(Table 5).
However, this improvementin the pricecompetitiveness
of U.S. exports to Japan must be weighed against other
competing countries' export price behavior as well, since
U.S. exporters compete with other countries in the Jap-
anese import market. An examination of major competi-
tors' export prices relative to Japan's domestic prices
reveals that the improvement in U.S. relative export prices
is not all that dramatic. In fact, according to Table 5, U.S.
exportprices relative to those of its majorcompetitors still
are relatively unfavorable. Thus, the degree of the overall
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 9Economic Review ! Spring 1988improvementhas been much smallerthan the change inthe
nominal dollar/yen exchange rate (29.4 percent in 1986
over the previous year) or the change in the dollar's real
bilateral exchange rate against the yen (25.6 percent).
In this connection, it is worth noting that U.S. export
prices relative to those of its competitors still are about 15
to 20 percentage points higher than they were in 1980
when the U.S. trade account was roughly in balance. In
otherwords, U.S. exporters have not yetrestored their lost
price competitiveness following the dollar's appreciation
through 1985. It is also significant that the cumulative
change in relative export prices against Japan's domestic
prices since 1980 still is far more advantageous to other
countries.
These facts are important because the differences in the
levels of relative export prices may influence the growth in
each countries' exports to Japan, given the structural
changes in the Japanese economy. The growth of new
Japanese import demands likely alters the historical rela-
tionship between imports and other variables, such as
export prices and income growth.
As we have seen in Sections II and III, various factors
have influenced the of the bilateral trade
imbalance between Japan and the U.S. The change in the
commodity composition of Japan's exports in response to
changes in U.S. demand and the structural features of
U.S. exports have played important roles in trade flows
between two nations. In addition, the delayed
ment of Japan's export prices due to the restrained pass-
through and the inadequate improvement of U.S.
prices relative to exporters' prices have weak-
ened adjustment to the currency realignment.
these factors cannot fully account for the relatively moder-
ate correction of the trade imbalance. For instance, contro-
versial microeconomic factors such as the effect of export
restraints on Japan's exports and the nonprice competitive-
ness of U.S. exports are not studied in this paper. These
points will have to be addressed in future studies.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The currency realignment in foreign exchange markets
since the meeting of G-5 nations in September 1985 has
contributed appreciably to the adjustment of international
trade imbalances. The improvement of the bilateral
imbalance between Japan and the U.S. , however, has been
somewhat limited by structural factors and otherelements
that have diminished the impact of the adjustment of
relative prices. Exchange rate changes alone are not suffi-
cient to eliminate the bilateral trade imbalance. In addi-
tion, restructuring the Japanese economy for less depend-
ence on external demand as well as restoring U.S.
competitiveness through heightened productivity growth
and restrained unit labor costs are both indispensable for
redressing the bilateral trade imbalance in the long run.
Japanese manufacturing industries are already moving
their production abroad through foreign direct investment
and by expanding imports of manufactured commodities
to substitute for domestic production. Moreover, many
Japanese industries such as iron and steel, chemicals, and
constructionmachineryarenow placing more emphasis on
domestic business since domestic demand is robust and
domestic sales have become more profitable. Such
developments should make Japan's imports more respon-
sive to growth in domestic demand and its exports less
elastic with respect to growth in foreign demand."? In the
meantime, improvement in such fundamental determi-
nants of U.S. competitiveness as productivity growth and
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
reduced unit labor costs has been observed along with
advantageous shifts in U.S. exporters' pricing behavior.
These trends suggest that the structural changes
required for further reductions in the bilateral trade
imbalance are emerging on both sides of the Pacific.
Structural changes will redress the imbalance in the long
run, not measures that focus on curbing Japan's exports
since these exports still have high income elasticities and
U.S. income still is growing. Even if it were possible to
reduce Japan's exports to the U.S. so steeply as to restore
balance, foreign economies would suffer from the impact
of this policy because of the resultant contraction in
Japan's import demand.
Accordingly, the best solution to the bilateral trade
imbalance should focus on durable growth in Japan's
imports from the U.S. In this regard, the most important
issue is whether the current strong growth in Japan's
manufactured imports can be sustainedor not. The issue of
Japan's barriers to agricultural imports is secondary in the
sense that the effect of removing these barriers on bilateral
trade is fairly small incomparison to the effect of growth in
Japan's manufactured imports. IS
With a view to supporting the economic restructuring
process indirectly, Japanese policymakers have been
implementingmeasures to stimulatedomesticdemandand
stabilize exchange rates in cooperation with other major
developed countries. Correcting the current external
nimbalance requires sustained growth in Japan's domestic
demand, not only because it induces more imports, but
also because it is conducive to minimizing the frictional
costs that accompany economic restructuring. Yet, it is
hardly possible to eliminate Japan's huge nominal trade
surplus in a year or two, because of the still-high income
elasticity of Japan's exports and the existing wide gap
between exports and imports. The conclusion that most
clearly emerges from this analysis is that Japanese policy
authorities have to achieve sustained growth in domestic
demand and maintain price stability over a fairly pro-
longed period.
The United States can contribute to reducing its trade
deficit by improving U.S. relative prices. As shown in the
text, this has been achieved so far by the dollar's decline
against major currencies. However, since the exchange
value of the dollar has already declined sharply, further
improvement of U.S. relative prices must be achieved
through productivity growth and reduced production
costs. At the same time, since inflationary pressure has
been mounting from the import side as a result of the
dollar's depreciation andtherearesome signs oftightening
supply/demand conditions in the U.S. economy, fiscaland
monetary policies aimed at future noninflationary eco-
nomic growth also are needed.
FOOTNOTES
Shares in Japan's Total Exports to the U.S.
(Percent)
7, It should be noted that the regression analysis employed
here implicitly assumes that income and price elasticities
have not changed over time,
8, Although the aggregated cumulative pass-through ratio
forJapan's exports between September 1985and April 1987
was 54,9 percent, there is considerable variance among
individual commodities:
1. Weighted-average exchange value of the US. dollar
against the currencies of other G-1°countries plus Switzer-
land, published by the Federal Reserve Board. Weights
come from the 1972-1976 global trade of each country.
2. Japan's real exports and imports with the US. can be
obtained by deflating dollar values of exports to, and imports
from, the U.S. by export and import price indices. In this
paper, theexport and import price indices with respect tothe
U.S. have been calculated as follows:
a) Calculate the commodity composition of exports to,
and imports from, the U.S., using the "Summary of
Report, Trade of Japan," Japan Tariff Association.
b) Find the export (or import) price index in yen terms of
each goods category in the same data source.
c) Obtain the price index of total exports (or imports) with
respect to the U.S.by making aweighted average of the
price indices of goods, the weight being the share of
each goods category in total exports (or imports) with
respect to the U.S.
d) Translate the yen-denominated price indices thus cal-
culated into those in dollar terms by the prevailing
dollar/yen exchange rate.
3. In fiscal 1986, Japan imported gold from the U.S, on
several occasions for the purpose of coining gold coins in
commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the current
emperor's reign,
4, Japan's real trade balance with its majortrading partners,
includino the U,S., is measured by a ratio of Japan's real
exports to its real imports,
5, In 1986, U,S. exports of industrial supplies and materials
to the European Community (EC) and Asian countries
increased substantially (+9,5 percent and + 11,9 percent
over the previous year, respectively), Accordingly, there is
the possibility that some of these exports ultimately went to
Japan in the form of final products exported from the ECand
Asian countries to Japan,
6. Japanese exports currently subject to U,S,trade restraints
(infiscal 1986)and their shares inJapan's total exports to the
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12 Economic Review / Spring 19889. Although such an assumption was introduced in this
paper for the sake of simplicity, it should be noted that in
reality Japan's export prices also affect its competitors'
export prices.
10. It should be borne inmind that the swollen profit margins
that had been attained during the last weak yen period
enabled Japanese exporters to squeeze their profits in this
process and, inthis sense,cushioned the impact ofthe yen's
appreciation. The ratio of current profit to sales in principal
manufacturing industries climbed to 4.65 percent in the first
half of 1984 and stayed at that level through the first half of
1985. Subsequently, it declined sharply to the recent trough
of 2.85 percent in the first half of 1986, reflecting profit-
squeezing in exports. The relationship between U.S import
prices and profit margins fromthe U.S.perspective hasbeen
analyzed by Catherine L. Mannin"Prices, ProfitMargins,and
Exchange Rates", Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1986.
11. Japan's real exports to the U.S. of individual com-
modities can be obtained by deflating the dollar value of
exports of the commodity by its export price index. Real
exports ofeach commodity category (forexample, consumer
goods) are calculated by aggregating real dollar values of
individual commodities in accordance with the definitions of
commodity categories given below:
a) Consumer goods
foodstuffs, television sets, automobiles, motor cycles,
cameras, watches, tape recorders, shoes, toys
b) Production goods
chemicals, textiles, metals, tires, integrated circuits,
non-metallic mineral products
c) Capital goods
power generating machinery, office machinery, metal-
working machinery, electrical machinery
12. This viewpoint was first raised by Daniel E. Nolle and
CharlesPigottin the Quarterly Review, Federal ReserveBank
of New York, Spring 1986.
13. Actually the U.S.producer price of office machinery rose
8.2 percent between 1980 and 1986 while Japan's export
price of office machinery in dollar terms fell by about 20
percent. Accordingly, U.S. relative prices deteriorated by
about 35 percent during the period.
14. "Import penetration" is defined as the ratio of imports of
manufactured goods to domestic absorption (namely,
GOP+imports exports). This ratio shows that Japan has
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
rapidly penetrated the U.S. market in recent years (0.6 per-
cent in 1970; 1.2 percent in 1980; 2.0 percent in 1986).
15. Forinstance, as a resultof foreign direct investment, the
so-called "boomerang effect" isevident inJapan's imports of
household appliances from Asian NICs as depicted in the
table below. Thiseffect may be partly responsible for a rapid
increase in Japan's manufactured imports from Asian
countries.
Import Volume by Commodity and by Region
(Percent change in fiscal 1986over the previous year)
Portable stereos (Korea) + 230
Personalstereos ( " ) + 230
Electric fans ( 1/ ) + 330
Refrigerators ( " ) + 230
Television sets (Taiwan) + 650
Calculators ( " ) + 250
Washing machines ( " ) +83.4
Sewing machines ( " ) +59.9
16. Inthis paper, avariable weight export deflator was used
to calculate the pass-through ratio.
17. Although the extent to which the structural economic
changes haveaffected Japan's balance of payments cannot
be quantified exactly, an attempt was made by the Bank of
Japan to estimate changes in the income elasticities of
Japan's exports and imports by means of Kalman filtering
models. According to those estimates, the income elasticity
of Japan's exports has declined gradually while that of its
imports has risen sharply since early 1986 (see Special
Paper No. 155, "Quarterly Economic Outlook", Autumn
1987).
18. According to a paper by Dick K. Nanto (submitted to the
Subcommittee on Economic Goals and Intergovernmental
PolicyoftheJoint Economic Committee ofthe U.S.Congress
on December 9, 1985), Japan's liberalization of agricultural
imports will increase U.S. exports to Japan by $1.7 to $5.3
billion. However, the effect is of a once-and-for-all nature
and, once Japan's agricultural imports are liberalized, such
an increase cannot be expected to last. In contrast, the
increase in U.S. manufactured exports to Japan by $12.6
billion in 1986 does represent a trend given the structural
changes in the Japanese economy. Such exports may even
grow if U.S competitiveness improves further
13